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Text-based CAPTCHAs remains a popular scheme for distinguishing between a legitimate human user and an
automated program. This article presents a novel genetic text captcha solver based on the generative adversarial
network. As a departure from prior text captcha solvers that require a labor-intensive and time-consuming
process to construct, our scheme needs signiicantly fewer real captchas but yields better performance in
solving captchas. Our approach works by irst learning a synthesizer to automatically generate synthetic
captchas to construct a base solver. It then improves and ine-tunes the base solver using a small number of
labeled real captchas. As a result, our attack requires only a small set of manually labeled captchas, which
reduces the cost of launching an attack on a captcha scheme. We evaluate our scheme by applying it to 33
captcha schemes, of which 11 are currently used by 32 of the top-50 popular websites. Experimental results
demonstrate that our scheme signiicantly outperforms four prior captcha solvers and can solve captcha
schemes where others fail. As a countermeasure, we propose to add imperceptible perturbations onto a captcha
image. We demonstrate that our countermeasure can greatly reduce the success rate of the attack.
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1 INTRODUCTION
ThecompletelyautomatedpublicTuringtest,orCAPTCHA1forshort,isoftenusedtodistinguish
legitimateusersfrommaliciousbots[67].Captchasexistinvariousforms,includingtexts[66ś68],
images[13],audio[55],video[56],andgames[19].Amongthese,textcaptchaisapopularscheme
andremainsbeingusedbythemajorityofthetop-50popularwebsitesrankedbyalexa.com,
includingMicrosoft,Google,eBayandmanyothers.
Breakingaparticularcaptchascheme2 israrelynewstoday.Thisisaheavilystudiedarea,and
manyscheme-speciiccaptchasolvershavebeenproposedinthepast.Theseminalworkpresented
byGregand℧alikdatedbackto2003wasamongtheirstattemptstoautomaticallysolvetext
captchas[28].However,mostofthepriorattacksarespeciicallytunedforafewspeciiccaptcha
schemesandadapting them foranewschemewould requiresigniicanthumanintervention
fortuningthemodelandcollectingtrainingdataśmanually-labeledcaptchaimages.Justlike
cryptography,textcaptchasareevolvingandbecomingmorerobustwheremanyoftheadvanced
featuresmakepriorattacksnolongerapplicable[18].
Byemployinganalyticalmodelsandalgorithms,someofthemorerecentworkshaveimproved
thegeneralizationabilityofacaptchasolver[8,10,18].Theideabehindsuchschemesisthata
captchasolvercanbetunedtotargetanewschemebychangingandadaptingthemodelparameters
andalgorithmthresholds.Theseschemes,however,areonlyefectiveinsolvingtextcaptchaswith
simplesecurityfeatures.Theirsuccessoftenreliesonagoodcharactersegmentationmethod[12],
buttherecentdevelopmentoftextcaptchashasmadecharactersegmentationmorechallengingby
introducingadvancedsecurityfeatureslikemorecomplexbackgroundsaswellasdistortedand
overlappingcharacters.
Inthisarticle,wepresentanewapproachforbuildingtextcaptchasolvers.Comparedtoprior
attacks,ourapproachrequiressigniicantlyfewernumbersofmanuallylabeledcaptchasbutdelivers
betterperformanceforsolvingawiderrangeofschemes.Ourworkisinspiredandenabledbythe
recentlyproposedgenerativeadversarialnetwork(GAN)[24]anditsbreakthroughefectivenessin
imagetranslationtasks[35].Toconstructasolverforagivencaptchascheme,weirstautomatically
learnaGAN-basedcaptchasynthesizerusingasmallsetoflabeledrealcaptchaimages.Next,we
usethelearnedsynthesizertoautomaticallygeneratealargenumberoftrainingsampleswithout
humaninvolvement,fromwhichwelearnabasesolver.Wethenapplytransferlearning[52]to
ine-tuneandimprovethebasesolver.Asasigniicantdeparturefrompriorattacks,ourapproach
greatlyreducesthecostandhumanefortsincreatingandtuningacaptchasolveraswellasthe
underpinninganalyticalmodelsandalgorithms.Ourapproachisgenerallyapplicablebecausethe
processforbuildingasolverismostlyautomaticandisnotcoupledtoaspeciicscheme.Weshow
thatourapproachcanresultinahighlyefectivesolverforalargesetofcurrentlyusedtextcaptcha
schemes,makingourattackaseverethreattotextcaptchas.
Weevaluatetheproposedschemethroughextensiveexperiments.Weapplyourapproachto33
textcaptchaschemes,11ofwhichwerebeingusedby32ofthetop-50popularwebsitesrankedby
alexa.comasofApril2019.Wecompareourapproachtofourpriorcaptchasolvers[8,10,18,20].
Experimentalresultsshowthatourapproachneedsasfewas500asopposedtomillions[23]labeled
captchaimagestolearnasuccessfulsolver.Despiteourapproachusesasigniicantlyfewernumber
ofrealcaptchas,itgivesahighersuccessrate.Experimentalresultsshowthatourapproachcan
successfullycrackalltestedschemes,judgedbythecommonlyusedstandard[10],anditcansolve
acaptchainlessthan50millisecondsusingamodestdesktopGPU.
1Toaidreadability,wewillusetheacronyminlowercasethereafter.
2Inthisarticle,thetermbreakingcaptchasreferstoautomaticallysolvethecaptchachallengeusingacomputerprogram,
i.e.,recognizingthecharactersofatextcaptchaimage.
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3. Occluding line2. Character overlapping
6. Solid and hollow fonts5. Different font sizes and colors 
4. Character rotating, 
distortion or waving 
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1. Noisy background
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features:
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Fig. 1. Security features of current text-based captchas used in this work. Label 1, 2, 3 show the anti-
segmentation features and label 4, 5, 6 present the anti-recognition features.
As a countermeasure, we turn again to the GAN framework. We show that by inserting some
imperceptible perturbations or noise to the captcha images, one can signiicantly decrease the
efectiveness of our attack. This provides a new way to protect the popular text captcha schemes
against machine-learning based attacks before a better alternative is adopted.
To sum up, this article makes the following technical contributions. It is the irst to:
• employ the generative adversarial paradigm to build a successful solver for text captchas
based on a small number of real captcha images;
• apply transfer learning to ine-tune a captcha solver that learned from synthetic data;
• show how a generic learning-based approach can be applied to target a rich set of captcha
schemes, which not only requires less human eforts to construct but also leads to better
performance over prior attacks;
• propose a new countermeasure for text captchas based on the generative adversarial paradigm.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we present the threat model, introduce the preliminaries of text captchas and the
GAN architecture.
2.1 Threat Model
Like many prior works, our attack employs supervised learning techniques to build a captcha
solver. The quality of a machine-learned model depends on the volume and quality of the training
data. In this work, we assume the adversary has access to a small number of manually labeled
captcha images for the target scheme. We refer these captchas as real captchas because they
are generated by the target scheme. The real captchas can be labeled either by the attacker or
paid crowdsourcing workers. Speciically, our attack needs as few as 500 real captchas to build a
successful captcha solver. Prior attacks based on machine learning models often require thousands
or sometimes millions of examples to learn a good captcha solver [1, 22, 23]. For example, the work
presented in [23] requires millions of captcha images to learn an efective CNN model to solve
reCAPTCHA. Compared to these prior attacks, our approach incurs signiicantly less overhead and
cost for collecting and labeling the data.
We also assume the adversary has suicient computing power to runmachine learning algorithms.
In this article, we show that the learning can be performed on a typical GPU cloud server, and the
learned solver can run eiciently on a modest desktop GPU.
2.2 Security Features of Text Captchas
A text captcha image often consists of distorted characters, a noisy background or occluding
lines, which are coined as security features. Without loss of generality, to make our experiments
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Fig.2. Overviewofourapproach. 1 Wefirstuseasmallsetofrealcaptchasandthesecurityfeaturesof
thetargetschemetolearnacaptchagenerationmodel. 2 Thecaptchagenerationmodelisthenapplied
toautomaticallygeneratesyntheticcaptchas(withandwithoutconfusingbackgroundpaterns)tolearn
apre-processingmodeltoremovesecurityfeatures,e.g.,noisybackgroundsandoccludinglines,fromthe
inputcaptchaimage. 3 Atthesametime,thesyntheticcaptchas(withoutsecurityfeatures)areusedtotrain
abasesolver. 4 Finally,weuseafewcleanrealcaptchas(thathavebeenprocessedbythepreprocessing
model)tofine-tunethebasesolvertobuildthefinalsolver.
manageable,werestrictourscopetosixwidelyusedsecurityfeaturesemployedbythecurrent
textcaptchaschemes.Theyareusedbythetop-50popularwebsitesrankedbyalexa.comatthe
timethisworkwasconducted.
Figure1 illustratessomeof thesecurity features targeted in thiswork.These includeanti-
segmentationandanti-recognitionfeatures.Theanti-segmentationfeature,labeledas1,2and3
inFigure1,aimstoincreasethedi cultyofcharactersegmentation.Aanti-recognitionfeature,
ontheotherhand,makesitdi cultforacomputerprogramtorecognizethecharacters.Thisis
achievedbyusingavarietyoffontstylesanddistortedcharacters,asdepictedinFigure1with
labels4,5and6.LaterinTable1,wesummarizehowthesesecurityfeaturesareusedindiferent
captchaschemes.
2.3 GenerativeAdversarialNetworks
OurworkistheirsttoapplytherecentlyproposedGANarchitecture[24]tolearnacaptcha
solver.AclassicalGANconsistsoftwomodules.Theirstisagenerativenetworkforgenerating
syntheticdata,andthesecondisadiscriminatornetworktoilteroutthesyntheticexamplesfrom
therealones.Totrainthegenerativeanddiscriminatornetworks,weusebackpropagation[31],a
well-establishedtrainingmethodforneuralnetworks.Duringeachtrainingiteration,thegenerator
aimstoproducebettersyntheticsampleswhilethediscriminatorwouldbecomemoreskilled
atlaggingsyntheticsamples.GANshavedemonstratedpromisingresultsinnaturallanguage
processing[42,76]andimagegeneration[35,77]tasks.
3 OVERVIEWOFOURAPPROACH
Figure2depictsthefourstepsofbuildingacaptchasolverusingourapproach.Eachofthesteps
isdescribedasfollows.
1 Trainingdatasynthesis.Toreducetheefortsforcollectingandlabelingrealcaptchasandat
thesametimeprovidesuicienttrainingdatatobuildanefectivecaptchasolver,weseekwaysto
generatesynthetictrainingdata.Wedosobylearningacaptchasynthesizerforatargetcaptcha
scheme(Figure2 1).Ourcaptchasynthesizerisaneuralnetworktrainedunderthegenerative
adversarialparadigm.OurGANconsistsof twocomponents.The first isacaptchageneration
Using Generative Adversarial Networks to Break and Protect Text Captchas 1:5
Generation 
Model
Discriminator
Network
synthetic captchas
real captchas
classification accuracy
acc.>th.?
captcha generation 
model
Yes
N
oAdjusting synthesizer parameters
Fig. 3. The training process of our GAN-based text captcha synthesizer.
model that tries to produce captchas which are as similar as possible to the target captchas. The
second is a discriminator that tries to identify the synthetic captchas from the real ones. This
generation-discrimination process terminates when the discriminator fails to identify a large
portion of the synthetic captchas. After training, we then use the learned captcha generation
model to automatically produce a large number of captchas together with their characters. This is
described in Section 4.1.
2 Preprocessing. To assist the captcha solver, we build a preprocessing model (Figure 2 2 )
to remove as much captcha security features as possible. The preprocessing model also tries to
standardize the font style by e.g., illing hollow characters and standardizing spaces or gaps between
characters. We leverage a speciic GAN called Pix2Pix [34] to build the pre-processor model. The pre-
processor model is trained by using solely synthetic captcha samples. Each training sample contains
two captcha images: one has security features, and the other does not. We learn a preprocessing
model for each captcha scheme and the training process is fully automatic. We describe this process
in more details at Section 4.2.
3 Training the base solver. In this step, we use the preprocessed synthetic captcha images together
with their corresponding character labels to learn a base solver (see Figure 2 3 ). Our base solver
is a standard Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). The trained solver takes in a pre-processed
captcha image and outputs the corresponding label. This is detailed in Section 4.3.
4 Fine-tuning the base solver. In this inal step, we apply transfer learning to further improve
the base solver (see Figure 2 4 ). Speciically, we use the set of manually labeled real captchas that
we used to train the captcha synthesizer to update the weights at some network layers of the base
solver. This is described with more details in Section 4.3.
4 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
This section provides details on how to build a captcha synthesizer to generate synthetic training
data (Section 4.1), and how to learn a preprocessing model (Section 4.2 ) and a captcha solver
(Section 4.3) using synthetic captcha images.
4.1 Training Data Synthesis
Prior work shows that to learn an efective CNN-based solver for text captchas would require as
many as 2.3 million of labeled training samples [20]. Collecting and labeling such large volume of
captchas would require intensive human eforts and incur signiicant cost. Our approach overcomes
this issue by using synthetic training data. To this end, we irst learn a captcha synthesizer and use
the synthesizer to populate the training data with a large number of synthetic captchas which are
similar to the target captchas. This allows the training dataset to cover the problem space far more
inely than what could be achieved by exclusively using manually-labeled real captchas.
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Security Feature  On/Off #Options Value Range
Noisy background(s) On 5 [10, img.width]
Occluding lines On 2 {Line, Sin, Quadratic, Bezieer}
Char. Overlapping On - [-3, 10]
Character set On 4 [A ʹ Z]
Font style(s) On 1 Solid
Font color(s) On 1 RGB (65, 103, 141)
Distortion On - {[0.1, 0.2], [0.2, 0.3]}
Rotation On - [-30, 30]
Waving Off - -
(a) Real Baidu captchas of 
different security features
(b) Synthetic parameters
(c) w/ security 
features
Generated synthetic captchas 
(d) w/o security 
features
Fig. 4. Example synthetic captchas for Baidu scheme. Our captcha synthesizer is trained using a set of real
captchas (a). The parameter seting (b) defines the security feature space. The trained captcha synthesizer is
used to produce synthetic captchas with (c) and without (d) the security features (i.e., noisy backgrounds and
occluding lines in this example) included.
Captcha Image 
Synthesizer
Parameter settings
LCxW
Random captcha words
+
GAN-captcha-
generator
1 2
Fig.5. Overviewofourcaptchagenerationmodel.Ourgeneratormodelincludesanimagesynthesizer(1)
andaGAN-captcha-generator(2).Theimagesynthesizertakesinawordofcharactersandthesecurity
featuresetingtoproduceaninitialcaptchaimage.TheGAN-captcha-generatorthenmodifiestheinitial
captchaimageatthepixellevel,aimingtomaketheresultantcaptchasaresimilartotheonesofthetarget
scheme.Oncethetrainingprocessiscompleted,thecaptchageneratormodelcanbeusedtoautomatically
generatethecaptchaimagesbasedonanygivenwordofcharacters.
AswehavebrielydescribedinSection3 ,ourGAN-basedcaptchasynthesizerconsistsofa
captchagenerationmodelandadiscriminator.Figure3illustratestheprocessoftrainingacaptcha
synthesizer.Thetrainingprocessislargelyautomaticexceptthatitneeds500manuallylabeled
realcaptchaimagesofthetargetschemeandasetofuser-deinedsecurityfeatures.Thesecurity
featuredeinitionisgivenbysettingasetofpre-deinedparameters.Asanexample,Figure4lists
allpre-deinedparametersoftheBaiducaptchascheme.Forthisexample,thewavingfeatureis
turnedofasitisnotusedbytheBaiduscheme.Itistonotethattheseparameterscanbeeasily
extendedandadjustedtotargetothercaptchaschemes.
Captchagenerationmodel.Figure5showsthatourcaptchagenerationmodeliscomprisedof
acaptchaimagesynthesizerandaGANcaptchagenerator.Theimagesynthesizerautomatically
generatescaptchaimagesforagivenparametersettingandasequenceofcharacters(i.e.,aword),
while theGANcaptchageneratormodiiesthesyntheticcaptchaatthepixell evel.Theimage
synthesizertakesinasecurityfeatureconigurationandtriestoindasetofparametervaluesso
thatthesyntheticcaptchasareassimilaraspossibletotheonesfromthetargetcaptchascheme.
Weusethegridsearchmethodpresentedin[4]toindtheoptimalparametersforagivencaptcha
scheme.Liketheimagegenerator,theGANcaptchagenertorlearnshowtomodifythegenerated
imagesatthepixellevelsothattheresultingcaptchacontainssecurityfeaturesthataresimilarto
therealonesofthetargetscheme.Thesimilarityismeasuredbytheratioofsyntheticcaptchas
thatcannotbedistinguishedfromtherealonesbythediscriminator.Inotherwords,themore
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synthetic captchas that can “fool" the discriminator, the higher quality the generated synthetic
captchas will be. We also use the similarity score to update the parameter values of the captcha
image synthesizer during the grid search process. Speciically, if the similarity score is above 0.65,
the parameter values will be reduced according to a given attenuation coeicient, or vice verse. It is
to note that once the captcha generation model is learned, it can automatically generate a synthetic
captcha image based on any given characters.
Captcha discriminator. Our discriminator model is also a CNN deined in [59]. The last layer of
the CNN gives the probability of an input captcha being a synthetic one. We use batches of captcha
images to train the discriminator, where each mini-batch consists of randomly sampled synthetic
captchas, x , and real captchas, y, and the target labels are 1 for every xi and 0 for every yj . The
discriminator network updates its parameters by minimizing the following loss function:
LD = −
∑
i
logD (xi ) −
∑
j
log(1 − D (yj )) (1)
where D (·) is the probability of the input being a synthetic captcha, and 1 − D (·) is that of a
real one. In this work, we use the Jensen-Shannon divergence [15] to evaluate the diference of
the distribution between the synthetic and real captcha images when training the discriminator.
We have also considered the Wasserstein distance [2] during our initial experiment but found
that the Jensen-Shannon divergence works better in our problem setting. Speciically, we found
that the Jensen-Shannon divergence metric can be used to better distinguish between two real
and synthetic captures that are visually similar. This capability helps us to better optimize the
generation parameters to improve the performance of the captcha generation model.
Training.We use the minibatch stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and the Adam solver [38] with
a learning rate of 0.0002 to train our captcha synthesizer. The objective of our captcha synthesizer
can be expressed as:
LcGAN = Ex,y∼pdata (x,y )[loдD (x ,y)] + Ex∼pdata (x ),z∼pz (z )[loд(1 − D (x ,G (x ,y)))] (2)
where x and y are a synthetic and a real captcha respectively, and z is the noise.
Our overall training objective follows the general GAN approach [59], using the L1 norm with the
regularization term λ set to 0.0001. The training objective is deined as:
G∗ = argmin
G
,max
D
LcGAN (G,D) + λLL1 (G ) (3)
where the generator, G , tries to minimize the diference between the generated captchas and the
real ones, while the discriminator, D, seeks to maximize it.
Here, the L1 loss function is deined as:
LL1 (G ) = Ex,y∼pdata (x,y ),z∼pz (z )[| |y −G (x , z) | |1] (4)
During training, when updating the parameters of the synthesizer, we ix the parameters of
the discriminator; and when updating the discriminator, we ix the parameters of the synthesizer.
Training terminates when the discriminator fails to identify more than 5% of the synthetic captchas.
Once the synthesizer is trained, it can be used to quickly generate synthetic captchas. In our case,
it takes less than one hour to generate a million captcha images.
Working example. We use the Baidu captcha scheme as a working example to illustrate the
process for training a captcha sythesizer. The training process consists of multiple steps. In the
initial step, we provide some (i.e., 500) real captchas for the GAN learning engine. We also give the
initial parameter values for the captcha image synthesizer. Similarly, the GAN captcha generator is
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Fig.6. ThetrainingprocessofourGAN-basedpre-processingmodel.Thegeneratortriestoremoveasmuch
noisybackgroundsandoccludinglinesfromtheinputcaptchas,whilethediscriminatortriestoidentify
whichoftheinputcleancaptchasareproducedbythegenerator.Allthecaptchasusedinthetrainingare
generatedbyourcaptchagenerationmodel.
initializedwithrandomweights.DuringeachiterationoftheGANtrainingprocess,thecaptcha
generationmodel(thatconsistsofthecaptchaimagesynthesizerandtheGANcaptchagenerator)a
batchofsyntheticcaptchaswhichareexaminedbythecaptchadiscriminator.Ifthediscriminator
cansuccessfullydistinguishalargenumberofsyntheticcaptchasfromtherealones,thegridsearch
methodisemployedtoadjusttheparametervaluesforsynthesizinganotherbatchofcaptchas.This
iterativelytrainingprocesscontinuesuntilthediscriminatorcandistinguishlessthan5%ofthe
syntheticcaptchasfromtherealones(seeSection6.5).Whentheprocessisterminated,thelearning
enginewilloutputtheoptimalparametervaluestobeusedbythecaptchaimagesynthesizerand
theGANcaptchageneratorforsynthesizingcaptchaimageswithsecurityfeatures.Togenerate
captchaswithoutsecurityfeatures,wesimplyturnofthefeatureoptionofthecaptchaimage
synthesizer.Forexamples,Figure4(a)showsrealBaiducaptchasand(c)and(d)inFigure4are
thesyntheticcaptchaswithandwithoutbackgroundsecurityfeaturesproducedbyourcaptcha
generationmodel.Ascanbeseenfromtheigure,thesecurityfeaturesofthesyntheticcaptchas
arevisuallysimilartotherealcaptchas.
4.2 CaptchaPreprocessing
℧oderncaptchaschemesoftenintegrateadvancedsecurityfeatureslikeanoisybackground
(Figure1a,b,andc)anddistortedhollowfonts(Figure1d,e,andf).Thesefeaturesmakeprior
pre-processingmethodslike[17,73]invalid(seeSection6.4).Inourwork,webuildaGAN-based
preprocessingmodeltoremovethesesecurityfeatures.Likethesynthesizer,wetrainapreprocessing
modelforeachcaptchascheme.Inourinitialexperiment,wealsotriedtobuildageneralpre-
processingmodelacrossdiferentcaptchaschemes.However,wefoundthatascheme-speciic
modelperformsbetter.Notethatweuseonlysyntheticcaptchastotrainthepreprocessingmodel.
Speciically,weadoptthePix2Piximage-to-imagetranslationframework[34]whichwasoriginally
developedtotransformanimagefromonestyletoanother.Inourcase,theimagestobetranslated
arecaptcha imageswithbackgroundnoisesuchas theBaiducaptchashown inFigure1bor
diferentfontstylessuchastheMicrosoftcaptchashowninFigure1d.Notethatourmodel
removesmultiplesecurityfeatures(e.g.,Figure4b)atonce.
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Synthetic captchas 
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Target captchas 
and their labels
(a) Train the base solver
(b) Train the fine-tuned solver
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Fig. 7. Our CNN-based captcha solver. We first use synthetic captchas to train the based solver (a) which is
then refined using a small number (500 in this work) of real captchas (b).
Our GAN-based preprocessing model also consists of a generator and a discriminator. Figure 6
depicts the training process. The generator works at the pixel level, which tries to amend some
pixels of the input captcha images (e.g., removing noise from the background shown as Figure 6b).
By contrast, the discriminator tries to distinguish the preprocessed captchas from the clean captchas
that are produced by the captcha generation model described in Section 4.1.
Training. Before training, we irst pre-train an initial generator and discriminator using some
synthetic captchas (Figure 6a). The captchas used in the pre-training process are organized as pairs
where each pair contains (1) a synthetic captcha image with the target security features and (2) a
corresponding image without these security features. Once the pre-training process is inished, we
continue to train them under the generative adversarial framework. The training process is similar
to how we train our captcha synthesizer (Section 4.1). Over time, the generator would become
better in removing security features, and the discriminator would become better in recognizing
security features (even the changes are small). Training terminates when the discriminator fails to
identify more than 5% of the preprocessed images from the clean counterparts (Figure 6c). After
that, we use the trained generator to preprocess unseen captcha images of the target scheme.
4.3 Build and Fine-tune the Solver
To build a captcha solver, we follow a two-step approach. We irst train a base solver from
synthetic captchas. We then ine-tune the base solver using the same set of real captchas used to
build the captcha synthesizer.
Network structure of our solver. Our captcha solver is built upon a classical CNN called LeNet-
5 [41], and it tries to identify the characters of the preprocessed captchas. Unlike LeNet-5 which
was initially designed to recognize single characters, we introduce some additional layers (2×
convolutional and 3× pooling layers) to extend its capability to recognize multiple characters.
Figure 7a shows the structure of our solver which has ive convolutional layers, ive polling layers
followed by two fully-connected layers. Each of the convolutional layers is followed by a pooling
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layer.Weusea3×3ilterfortheconvolutionallayerandamax-poolingilterforthepoolinglayer.
WeusethedefaultparametersofLeNet-5fortherestofthenetworkstructures.
ItistonotethatwehavealsoconsideredotherinluentialCNNstructuresincludingResNet[30],
Inception[64]andVGG[60].Wefoundthatthereislittlediferenceinsolvingtextcaptchasamong
thesemodels.WechooseLeNet-5duetoitssimplicity,whichgivesthequickestinference(i.e.,
prediction)timeandrequirestheleasttrainingsamplesforine-tuningthebasesolver.
Trainingthebasesolver.Wetrainabasesolverforatargetcaptchascheme.Incasethatthe
numberofcharactersofacaptchaimageisnotixedforascheme,wealsotrainabasesolverfor
eachpossiblenumberofcharacters.Weuse200,000syntheticcaptchasgeneratedbyourcaptcha
generationmodeltotrainthebasesolver.Eachtrainingsampleconsistsofacleancaptcha(produced
bythepreprocessingmodel)andanintegervectorthatstoresthecharacterIDsofthecaptcha.
NotethatweassignauniqueIDtoeachcandidatecharacterofthetargetcaptchascheme.Weuse
aBayesianbasedparametertuner[21]toautomaticallychoosethehyperparametersfortraining
thebasesolver.TrainingabasesolvertakesaroundivehoursusingfourNVIDIAP40GPUsona
cloudserver(seeSection5.3).Thetrainedbasesolvercanthenbeappliedtoanyunseencaptcha
imageofthetargetscheme.
Reiningthebasesolver.Toine-tunethebasesolver,weapplytransferlearning[75]toupdate
laterlayers(i.e.,thosethatareclosertotheoutputlayer)ofthebasesolver,byusingthe500labeled
realcaptchasthatwerepreviouslyusedtotrainthesynthesizer.Theideaoftransferlearning,ina
nutshell,isthatinneuralnetworkclassiication,informationlearnedattheearlylayersofneural
networks(i.e.,closertotheinputlayer)willbeusefulformultipleclassiicationtasks.Thelater
thenetworklayersare,themorespecializedthelayersbecome[52].Weexploitthispropertyto
calibratethebasesolvertominimizeanybiasandover-ittingthatmayarisefromthesynthetic
trainingdata.
Figure7billustratestheprocessofapplyingtransferlearningtoreinethebasesolver.Transfer
learninginourcontextisassimpleaskeepingtheweightsoftheearlylayersandthenupdatethe
parametersofthelaterlayersbyapplyingthestandardtrainingprocessusingtherealcaptchas.
Thisprocesstakeslessthan5minutesonourtrainingplatform.
5 EXPERIMENTALSETUP
5.1 CaptchaSchemes
Ourevaluationtargets11currenttextcaptchaschemesusedby32ofthetop-50popularwebsites
rankedbyalexa.com3.Wenotethatsomeofthewebsitesusethesamecaptchascheme,e.g.,
YoutubeusestheGooglescheme,andLive,OfficeandBingusetheMicrosoftscheme.The
websitesweexaminedcoverawiderangeofdomainsincludinge-commerce,socialnetworks,
search,andinformationportals.Table1givessomeexamplesofthecaptchaschemestestedinthis
work.Wenotethatmanycaptchaschemesexcludesomespeciiccharactersthatarelikelytocause
confusionafterperformingthecharacterdistortion,forimprovingtheusabilityofthecaptchas.
Examplesofsuchcharactersinclude‘o'and‘0',‘1'and‘l',etc(SeeTable1).
Inadditiontothe11currentschemes,wealsoextendourevaluationto22othercaptchaschemes
(SeeTable5)usedinpriorstudiestoprovideafaircomparisonwithpreviousattacks.Itisworth
mentioningthatwhilewecollectedthecaptchasfromtheoicialwebsites,manyofthecaptcha
schemeswetestedarealsousedbythird-partywebsitesandapplicationsasasecuritymechanism.
3Wehaverefreshedthecaptchadatasetusedinourpreviouswork[74]whenconductingthisevaluation.
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Table 1. Text-based captcha schemes tested in our experiments.
Security Features
Scheme Website(s) Example
Anti-segmentation Anti-recognition
Excluded
Characters
Google
google.{com,co.in,co.jp,
co.uk,ru,com.br,fr
com.hk,it,ca,es,com.mx}
youtube.com
Overlapping characters,
Enligh letters
Varied font sizes & color,
rotation, disortion
and waving
ś
Microsoft
{live, bing, miscosoft,
office, linkedin}.com
Overlapping characters,
solid background
Diferent font styles,
varied font sizes,
rotation, waving
0, 1, 5
D, G, I, O, U
Alipay
{alipay, tmall,
taobao, login.tmall,
alipayexpress}.com
English letters and
arabic numerals,
overlapping characters
Rotation and distortion
0, 1
I, L, O
eBay ebay.com
Overlapping characters,
Only arabic numerals
Rotating, distortion
and waving ś
Wikipedia wikipedia.org
Overlapping characters,
Enligh letters
Rotation, distortion
and waving ś
Baidu {baidu, qq}.com
Occluding lines,
character overlapping,
only Enligh letters
Varied font size, color,
rotation, disortion
and waving
Z
Sina sina.cn
English letters and
arabic numerals,
overlapping characters
Rotation, distortion
and waving
1, 9, 0
D, I, J, L, O, T
i, j, l, o, t, g, r
Weibo weibo.cn
English letters and
arabic numerals,
overlapping characters,
occluding lines
Rotation and distortion
0, 1, 5
D, G, I, Q, U
Sohu sohu.com
Complex background,
occluding lines,
and overlapping
Varied font size, color
and rotation
0, 1
i, l, o, z
Qihu360 360.cn
English letters and
arabic numerals,
overlapping characters
Varied font sizes,
rotation and distortion
0
I, L, O, T
i, l, o, t, q
JD jd.com
English letters and
arabic numerals,
overlapping characters
Rotation and distortion
0, 1, 2, 7, 9
D, G, I, J,
L, O, P, Q, Z
5.2 Collecting and Synthesizing Captchas
We use two sets of captchas in evaluation: one for training and the other for testing. ℧ost of
training data are synthetic captchas generated by our captcha generation model. The testing data
are collected from the target website for training and testing our GAN-based synthesizer and the
ine-tuned solver.
Synthesizing training captchas.We irst initialize the security feature parameters as described
in Section 4.1 and then use the initial parameters to generate the irst batch of synthetic captchas ś
which are then used together with 500 real captchas to train our synthesizer. After we have trained
the synthesizer, we then use it to generate synthetic samples to learn the preprocessing model and
the base solver. Speciically, we use 20,000 and 200,000 synthetic captchas to train the preprocessing
model and the base solver respectively.
Collecting testing captchas. The real captchas are automatically collected using a web crawler
written in Python. Each collected captcha is manually labeled by three paid participants (nine
participants in total) recruited from our institution. We use only captchas where a consensus has
been reached by all the three annotators. In total, we have used 1,500 real captchas for each target
scheme. We randomly divided the collected captchas into two sets, one set of 500 captchas for
training our synthesizer and the inal solver, and the other set of 1,000 captchas for testing our
solver. It takes up to 30 minutes (less than 10 minutes for most schemes) to collect 500 captchas
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Table 2. The overall success rate and solver running time.
Success rate
Scheme
Base Solver Fine-tuned Solver
Running Time per
Captcha (ms)
Sohu 83% 92% 43.78
eBay 52% 86.6% 4.22
JD 60% 86% 43.18
Wikipedia 7% 78% 4.71
Microsoft 36.6% 69.6% 46.06
Alipay 23% 61% 3.75
Qihu 360 48.6% 56% 41.03
Sina 40.6% 52.6% 42.81
Weibo 4.7% 44% 3.41
Baidu 6% 34% 41.57
Google 0% 3% 4.02
andlessthan2hourstolabelthembyoneuser.Thissuggeststhattheefortandcostforlaunching
ourattackonaparticularcaptchaschemeislow.
5.3 ImplementationandHardwarePlatforms
Ourprototypesystem4 isimplementedusingPython.Thepreprocessingmodelisbuiltupon
thePix2Pixframework[34],implementedusingTensorlowv.1.12,andthecaptchasolveriscoded
usingKerasv.2.1.Weusetwodiferenthardwareplatforms.Fortraining,weuseacloudserver
witha2.4GHzIntelXeonCPU,fourNVIDIATeslaP40GPUsand256GBofRA℧,runningthe
Centos7operatingsystemwithLinuxkernel3.10.Thetrainedmodelsarethenrunandtestedona
desktopPCwitha3.2GHzIntelXeonCPU,aNVIDIATitanGPUand64GBofRA℧,runningthe
Ubuntu16.04operatingsystemwithLinuxkernel4.10.AlltrainedmodelsrunontheTitanGPU
forinference.
6 EXPERIMENTALRESULTS
Inthissection,weirstpresenttheoverallsuccessrateofourapproachforsolving11current
captchaschemes.Wethencompareourapproachagainstpriorattacksonanother22schemes.
Next,weanalyzetheworkingmechanismofourapproachbeforediscussingtheimpactofsecurity
featuresonuserexperienceandthegeneralizationabilityofourapproach.
6.1 EvaluationonCurrentCaptchaSchemes
Table2presentsthesuccessrateandtheaveragerunningtimeinsolvingacaptchaimagefor
11currentschemes.Thereisnodiferenceinsolvingtimebetweenthebaseandtheine-tuned
solversbecausetheyusethesamenetworkstructure.Foreachcaptchascheme,wereportthe
averagerunningtimeacross1,000captchas.Weobservelittlevariationintherunningtime,less
than0.5%acrosstestruns.Notethatinthisevaluation,allcaptchaimagesofaschemecontainthe
samenumberofcharacters.InSection6.3,weshowhowourapproachcanbeextendedtotargeta
variablenumberofcharacters.
6.1.1 Overallsuccessrate.Ourbasesolver,builtfromsyntheticdata,isabletosolvemostofthe
captchaschemeswithasuccessrateofover20%.ThisdemonstratesthecapabilityofCNNmodelsin
4Codeanddataareavailableat:https:⁄⁄goo.gl⁄92VxXC.
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Table 3. Example text-based captchas that are incorrectly labeled by our fine-tuned solver.
Scheme Captcha Image Ground Truth Solver Output Human Attempts
Sohu d4sk d4sh 1.6
eBay 934912 994912 1.8
JD BHER BFER 1.5
Wikipedia druidsemi druidseml 1.5
Microsoft XK6NK XK6VK 1.2
Alipay B7JK B7YK 1.6
Qihu 360 s34Ea s3VFa 1.8
Sina nG3uu nG3uv 1.4
Weibo 4TXB 4TX8 1.4
Baidu WFIH WFEH 1.8
Google irgandoca igiruloca >10
(a) Original Google captchas with different fonts and strong security features
(b) Synthetic Google captchas using our captcha generator
Fig. 8. Examples of real Google captchas (a) and the synthetic versions (b).
performing image recognition. However, it gives a low success rate for some of the schemes such as
Weibo (4.7%) and Google (0%). The ine-tuned solver, reined using transfer learning, signiicantly
boosts the performance of the base solver. In particular, it improves the success rate for Wikipedia
from 7% to 78%, Weibo from 4.7% to 44%, Alipay from 23% to 61% and Microsoft from 36.6% to
69.6%. This result shows that transfer learning in combination with captcha synthesis can reduce
the data collection eforts for building an efective text captcha solver.
The reined solver also improves the success rate for Google captcha from 0% to 3%. This
relatively low success rate is because of the strong security features like distorted, overlapping,
waving characters and dynamic font styles employed by the scheme. These features make it di cult
for our captcha generation model to generate high-quality synthetic data. Figure 8 shows that our
synthetic captchas are not suiciently similar to the real captchas (especially for the font styles).
We also observe that some security features like overlapping, rotated, distorted characters and
dynamic font styles can provide stronger protection under our attack over features like noisy
background and occluding lines. Nevertheless, 3% is still above the 1% threshold for which a captcha
is considered to be inefective [10]. We stress that no prior attack before ours can successfully crack
the current Google captcha scheme under this criterion.
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Table 4. How oten a common English prefix and sufix appears at the 5, 000 captcha images from Google
and Wikipedia.
Number Number
Preixes
Google Wikipedia
Suixes
Google Wikipedia
dis- 76 21 -ing 337 95
pre- 49 10 -est 166 105
mis- 44 9 -ion 129 26
anti- 15 3 -ness 77 6
semi- 7 2 -tion 63 12
fore- 3 2 -less 28 5
inter- 3 1 -ation 21 4
under- 1 0 -ative 8 2
trans- 0 1 -itive 3 0
6.1.2 Incorrectlylabeledcaptchas.Table3givessomeexamplecaptchasthatareincorrectlylabeled
byourine-tunedsolver.Formostofthesecaptchas,oursolveronlyincorrectlyrecognizeone
characterandthemis-identiiedcharacterissimilartothegroundtruth.Forexample,fortheeBay
captchashowninTable3,oursolverincorrectlylabelcharacter"3"to"9"duetocharacteroverlap-
ping.FortheGooglescheme,oursolveroftenfailstolabelseveralcharactersinthemiddledueto
excessivecharacterdistorationandoverlapping.However,ourannotatorswerealsostrugglingto
recognizethecharactersforthosecaptchas.Toquantifythedi culty,weaskedtenannotatorsto
labelthosecaptchasandcountthenumberofattemptsrequiredtosucceed.Thelastcolumnof
Table3givestheaveragednumberofattemptsrequiredbyourannotatorstosuccessfullyrecognize
imagesofacaptchascheme.Theresultssuggestthatourannotatorsfounditdi culttorecognize
mostofthecaptchaschemesintheirstattempt.Inparticular,duetothestrongdistortedand
occultinglinesoftheGooglecaptchascheme,morethanhalfofourannotatorsfailedtorecognize
aGooglecaptchaimagewithintenattempts.
6.1.3 Exploitingcaptchapaternstoimprovethesuccessrate.SomecaptchaschemeslikeGoogle
andWikipediahavemorethaneightcharactersinasinglecaptchaimage.Wecalltheselong-
charactercaptchaschemes.Wenoticethatthecharactersofalong-charactercaptchaimagetend
tofollowsomepatterns,wheresomeEnglishwordpreixesorsuixesappearfrequently.Wethink
thismightbeafeatureforhelpingahumanusertobetterrecognizethecharacters.Toverifyour
hypothesis,wecollectedandmanuallylabeled5,000captchaimagesinadditiontothe1,000testing
captchasusedfortheGoogleandtheWikipediaschemes.Wethencounthowoftenacommonly
usedEnglishwordpreixandsuixappearsinthe5,000captchasforeachofthetwoschemes,by
usingthelistofpreixesandsuixessuggestedin[45].
Table4listssomeofthefrequentlyappearedpreixesandsuixes,containingatleastthree
characters.Weseethatathree-characterpreixorsuixappearsatleast9times(upto76)inthe
5,000captchaimagesofascheme.Thisisgreaterthantheaveragedfrequencyof1.99ifthose
charactersareevenlyandrandomlydistributedacrossthe26Englishalphabetlettersoverthe5,000
captchasofascheme.Wealsoobserveasimilarpatternforpreixesorsuixeswithfourormore
characters,althoughtheyhavelessfrequencyofappearanceoverthethree-charactercounterparts.
Heuristics.Wewondered ifonecanexploitthisobservationto improvethesuccessrateofa
captchasolver.Inotherwords,canwebuildacontext-sensitivecaptchasolvertocorrectsomeof
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(b) reCaptcha 2013 (c) Microsoft
(d) QQ (f) Yahoo!
(a) eBay
(e) Amazon
Fig. 9. Examples of the captcha schemes (let) tested in prior work, and the synthetic versions (right) generated
by our captcha generation model. Our generation model is highly efectively in synthesizing captcha images.
the characters after performing image recognition? To this end, we develop a heuristic to post-
process the characters given by the ine-tuned solver to target the English word preixes and suixes
listed in Table 4. Speciically, for a solved captcha word, we irst identify whether the word contains
a candidate pattern. A candidate pattern is a sequence of characters which similar to a word preix
or suix, but only with a few characters that are diferent from a standard word preix or suix. For
example, “trani" is a candidate pattern for word preix “ trans" as both words are only diferent in
the last character, ‘i'. A solved captcha word can also contain multiple. In this case, we will use
the preixes and suixes listed in Table 4 to search for the possible candidate patterns. Using this
strategy, our heuristic would correct the candidate pattern “seml" to “semi". Doing so gives a correct
prediction for the Wikipedia captcha shown in Table 3. Applying this strategy to the 1, 000 test
captchas images for Google and Wikipedia, we improve the success rate for the Google scheme
from 3% to 5.1% and the Wikipedia scheme from 78% to 79.8%.
6.1.4 Training and deployment overhead. It took us around 2 days to train a captcha synthesizer
and the preprocessing model together on our training platform, and less than 50 milliseconds
to solve a captcha on our evaluation platform using a desktop GPU. For captcha schemes with
a confusing background or occluding lines (e.g., Baidu and Sina captchas in Table 2), our solver
can take 10× longer than others to solve process a captcha image. This overhead comes from the
preprocessing model. As we train a scheme-speciic preprocessing model with diferent network
structures, the stronger the security features are, the more complex the preprocessing will be (and
hence longer running times). Nonetheless, our approach can solve all the testing schemes under
the commonly used criterion [10] with a quick running time.
6.2 Comparison to Prior Atacks
We now compare our approach with four state-of-the-art methods [8, 10, 18, 20] on 24 distinct
captcha schemes, including the eBay and Wikipedia schemes from Table 1 and other 22 schemes.
To provide a fair comparison, we try to use captchas that prior methods were tested on. When
possible, we use the same dataset or captchas from the original scheme on which the prior work
was evaluated. For those obsolete captcha schemes (21 out of 24 schemes), we collected the test
data from public datasets, or using captcha generation tools developed by independent researchers.
Speciically, we use (1) public datasets of previous captcha schemes, (2) online captcha generators,
such as captchas.net which was used by some of the previous captcha schemes, and (3) open
source captcha generators used by prior work.
For each captcha scheme, we collected 1,500 samples ś from which we use 500 for training and
1,000 for testing. Figure 9 gives some examples of the real captchas and the one produced by our
generation model. The igure suggests that our generation model can produce captchas that are
visually similar to real examples from the target scheme.
Table 5 compares our ine-tuned solver to previous attacks. Our approach outperforms all
comparative schemes by delivering a signiicantly higher success rate. For many of the testing
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Table 5. Comparing our approach against four prior atacks [8, 10, 18, 20] on 24 captcha schemes where prior
methods were tested on. Here B-11 and B-14 represent the method of [10] and [11] respectively.
Success rate Success rate
Captcha Scheme Captcha Example
B-11 [10] Ours
Captcha Scheme Captcha Example
Gao’s Ours
℧egaupload 93% 100% Baidu (2016) 46.6% 97.5%
Blizzard 70% 100% QQ 56% 94%
Authorize 66% 100% Taobao 23.4% 90.7%
Captcha.net 73% 99.6% Sina 9.4% 90%
NIH 72% 99% reCAPTCHA (2011) 77.2% 87.4%
Reddit 42% 98% eBay 58.8% 86.6%
Digg 20% 95% Amazon 25.8% 79%
eBay 43% 86.6% Wikipedia 23.8% 78%
Slashdot 35% 86.4% ℧icrosoft 16.2% 72.1%
Wikipedia 25% 78% Yahoo! (2016) 5.2% 63%
Success rate Success rate
Captcha Scheme Captcha Example
B-14 [11] Ours
Captcha Scheme Captcha Example
George’s Ours
reCAPTCHA (2013) 22.3% 90% PayPal 57.1% 92.4%
Baidu (2013) 55.2% 89% reCAPTCHA (2011) 66.6% 87.4%
reCAPTCHA (2011) 22.7% 87.4% Yahoo! (2016) 57.4% 63%
eBay 51.4% 86.6%
Baidu (2011) 38.7% 83.1%
Wikipedia 28.3% 78%
Yahoo! (2014) 5.3% 75.1%
CNN 51.1% 51.6%
schemes,ourapproachbooststhesuccessrateby40%.Itcansuccessfullysolveallthecaptchasof
Blizzard,℧egauploadandAuthorizeusedin[10].Ourapproachachievesasuccessrateof87.4%
and90%forreCAPTCHA2011and2013respectively.Thisschemewaspreviouslydeemedtobe
strongwherethehumanaccuracyis87.4%[20].Thatistosay,oursolvermatchesthecapability
ofhumansinsolvingreCAPTCHA.ToachieveacomparableaccuracyforreCAPTCHA,aCNN-based
captchasolver[23]wouldrequire2.3millionuniquerealcaptchaimages[20],butourapproach
needsonly500.Wenotethatunlikeallthecompetitiveapproacheswhichrequiremanuallytuning
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Fig. 10. The success rate of our prediction model when targeting captchas with variable number of characters.
a character segmentation method, we forgo this process. Thus, our approach requires less expert
involvement but gives better performance.
6.3 Targeting Schemes with A Variable Number of Characters
One potential criticism of our approach described so far is that it only targets captcha schemes
with a ixed number of characters. However, our approach can be extended to target schemes with
a variable number of characters. One way for doing that is to have a model to predict how many
characters a preprocessed image may contain, and then use a captcha solver that is speciically
built for that number of characters.
To test this strategy, we use a CNN to build a character number predictor. Our model consists of
four convolutional layers, four pooling layers and a fully connected layer, and a max-pooling layer
follows each of the convolutional layers. The ilter size in each convolutional layer is 5 × 5, and
other parameters are the same as our base captcha solver.
We evaluated our predictor using Google and Wikipedia captchas, both use a variable number
(8, 9 or 10) of characters. For each scheme, we use 100, 000 synthetic captchas (around 33, 333
captchas per character length) for training the predictor and 3, 000 (1, 000 per character length)
real captchas for testing. Figure 10 shows the accuracy for predicting the number of characters in
a captcha image. Our predictor gives an accuracy of 90.9% and 80.8% for Wikipedia and Google
schemes respectively.
When combining the predictor with our ine-tuned solver (but not using the context-aware
heuristic described in Section 6.1.3), we see a slight drop in the accuracy. This is expected as our
character-number predictor is not perfect. The combination gives a success rate of 70.9% and 2%
for Wikipedia and Google schemes respectively. The resulting success rates are still higher than
the 1% threshold for which a captcha scheme is seen to be inefective [10].
6.4 Preprocessing Security Features
Recall that the second step of our attacking pipeline is to remove the security features and stan-
dardize the font style of an input captcha. In this experiment, we compare our preprocessing model
against prior preprocessing methods on removing noisy backgrounds [8, 10, 36], and standardizing
font styles [12, 17] and character gaps [18].
Removing security features. The classical methods used in prior attacks for preprocessing
captchas is iltering [8, 10, 36]. The idea is to apply a ix-sized window, or ilter kernel, throughout
the image to remove the occluding lines and noise while keeping edges of the characters. As can
1:18 Ye, G. et al
(a) Input Baidu captchas
(c) Applying our pre-processing model
(b) Applying a 2   1, 2   2, 3   1 filter kernel respectively × × ×
Fig. 11. For the input images (a), a filter-based method fails to remove security features (b) while our approach
can (c).
(b) Results given by Gao's approach
(a) Example hollow captchas from Sina and Microsoft schemes
(c) Results given by our pre-processing model
Fig. 12. Comparing font style standardization between a state-of-the-art hollow captcha solver [17] and our
preprocessing model. Our preprocessing model is able to fill the hollow parts more efectively.
be seen from Figure 11, inding the right ilter kernel size is di cult. This is because the ilter
either fails to eliminate the background and occluding lines or it overdoes it by eroding edges of
the characters (Figure 11b). While iltering was efective for prior text-based captchas, the latest
captcha schemes have introduced more sophisticated security features which make it no longer
feasible. In contrast to iltering, our preprocessing model can successfully eliminate nearly all the
background noise and occluding lines from the input image, leading to a much cleaner captcha
image while keeping the character edges, as depicted in Figure 11c.
Filling hollow characters. Figure 12 compares our preprocessing model against a state-of-the-art
hollow captcha solver [17]. The task in this experiment is to ill the hollow parts of the characters.
Here, we apply both schemes to the testing hollow captchas from Sina and Microsoft schemes.
Figure 12a gives some of the examples from these two schemes, while Figures 12b and 12c present
the corresponding results given by the hollow illing method in [17] and our approach respectively.
As can be seen from the diagrams, our preprocessing model is able to ill most of the hollow strokes,
but the state-of-the-art method leaves some hollow strokes unilled. Therefore, our approach is
AC℧ Transactions on Privacy and Security, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2020.
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(a) Wikipedia (b) Microsoft
(c) Sina (d) Baidu
Fig. 13. Character segmentation produced by our preprocessing model. For each scheme, the let image is
the input captcha, and the right image is the output of our preprocessing model.
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Fig. 14. Using our character segmentation approach can help to improve the success rate of prior work [18].
more efective in standardizing the font style. We also note that unlike prior attacks which require
manually designing and tuning an individual method to process each security feature, our approach
automatically learns how to process all features at one go. Therefore, our approach requires less
efort for implementing a holistic preprocessing model.
Standardizing character gaps. Prior work has reported that the robustness of a text captcha
scheme largely dependents on the di culty of character segmentation rather than character
recognition [12]. ℧any modern text captchas are designed to make it harder for a computer
program to segment the characters. The examples given in Figure 13 show that our preprocessing
model is efectively in standardizing the gap between characters. To evaluate the efectiveness of
our preprocessing model for character segmentation, we use the same network structure to train a
model solely for character segmentation. We then use the preprocessing model to replace the native
character segmentation model used in [18], but keep the remaining parts unchanged. Figure 14
shows that our preprocess along can help to greatly improve the success rate of a previous solver.
6.5 Synthesizer Training Termination Criteria
Our captcha synthesizer is trained under the GAN framework, and training terminates when the
discriminator fails to classify a certain ratio of synthetic captchas (Section 4.2). Figure 15 reports how
the termination criterion afects the quality of the synthetic captchas. The x-axis shows the ratio
(from 0.8 to 0.97) of synthetic captchas that are misclassiied as a real captcha by the discriminator
when training terminates. The y-axis shows the success rate achieved by the ine-tuned solver for
ive current captcha schemes, where the base solver is trained on the resulting synthetic captchas
using diferent termination criteria but the ine-tuned solver is trained on the same set of real
captchas.
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Fig. 15. How the synthesizer training termination criterion afects the solver performance. Training terminates
when the discriminator fails to classify a certain ratio of synthetic captchas.
In general, the more synthetic captchas that the discriminator fails on, the higher the quality
the generated synthetic captchas will be, which in turns leads to a more efective captcha solver.
However, the increase in the success rate reaches a plateau at 0.95. Further increasing the similarity
of the synthetic captchas to real ones does not improve the success rate due to overitting. Based
on this observation, we choose to terminate synthesizer training when the GAN discriminator can
successfully distinguish less than 5% (i.e., fail on 95% or more) of the synthetic captchas. We found
that this threshold works well for all captcha schemes tested in this work.
6.6 Transfer Learning
Recall that we only use 500 real captchas to reine the base solver by employing transfer learning
(Section 4.3). Our strategy for transfer learning is to only retrain some of the latter neural network
layers of the base solver (see Figure 7). In this experiment, we investigate how the choice of transfer
learning layers afects the performance of the ine-tuned solver. To that end, we apply transfer
learning to diferent levels of the base solver, by changing the starting point of transfer learning
from the 2nd convolutional layer (CL) all the way down to the irst fully-connected layer (FC).
6.6.1 Identify the best beginning layers. We apply transfer learning to diferent levels of the base
solver. This is achieved by changing the starting point of transfer learning from the 2nd convo-
lutional layer (CL) all the way down to the irst fully-connected layer (FC). To determine the best
starting layer for transfer learning, we apply cross-validation to the real captcha training dataset.
Specially, we divide the 500 real captchas into two parts, the irst part of 450 captchas is used to
reine the base solver, and the rest 50 captchas are used to validate the reined solver. We vary the
beginning layer for transfer learning and then test the reined base solver on the validation set to
ind out which beginning layer leads to the best performance. Figure 16 reports performance of
the resulting ine-tuned solvers trained under diferent transfer learning conigurations for the 11
current captcha schemes given in Table 1. Overall, applying transfer learning to the second or third
CL onward leads to the best performance. Furthermore, this reining process only takes several
minutes as it uses just 500 captchas.
6.6.2 Findingsuitabletrainingdatasize. Inthisexperiment,weevaluatehowthenumberofreal
captchasusedintransferlearningafectsthesuccessrateoftheine-tunedsolver.Figure17shows
thesuccessratesofthefine-tunedsolverwhenusingdifferentnumbersofrealcaptchasintransfer
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Fig. 16. How the beginning layer for transfer learning afects the resulting performance of the fine-tuned
solver.
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Fig. 17. The achieved success rates when the fine-tuned solver is trained using diferent number of real
captchas.
learning. When the number of training examples is 500, our approach reaches a high success
rate. For most captcha schemes, the success rate drops signiicantly when the number of training
examples less than 400. Nevertheless, our approach can achieve a high success rate when the
number of training examples is 500. Such a number allows an attacker to collect from the target
website easily.
6.7 Captcha Usability Study
Our evaluation also includes a user study to quantify the impact of security features on user
experience (i.e., captcha usability) and the success rate of our solver. Speciically, we have conducted
an online survey by recruiting 20 participants to ill in an anonymous questionnaire. Our participants
are at the age group of under 30s and are familiar with text captchas. In the questionnaire, we present
100 synthetic captchas with diferent security strength. We divide the synthetic captchas into six
categories based on the number of characters and the security parameters used for generating
the captcha. In the survey, we give each participant one minute to label a captcha and ask each
participant to rate the usability of ive captchas from each category on a 5-point Likert-scale, where
1 = very poor and 5 = excellent usability.
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Table 6. Example captchas used in our user study, the success rates of humans and our approach, and the
usability rating.
Security Features Success Rate
No. Example
Anti-segmentation Anti-recognition Humans Ours
Usability
1
English letters,
arabic numerals
Rotation,
varied font sizes
95.25% 100% 4
2 English letters
Rotation,
varied font sizes
90.25% 88% 2.75
3
English letters,
complex background
Rotation, distortion 91% 96% 2.8
4
English letters,
overlapping characters,
complex background
Varied font sizes,
rotation, distortion
89.25% 86% 2.7
5 English letters
Varied font sizes,
ratation, distortion
79.75% 77% 2.8
6
English letters,
overlapping characters
Varied font sizes,
rotation, distortion,
waving
68.75% 40% 2.1
Table6givesthecriteriausedtodeterminethecaptchadi cultiesandan examplecaptcha
foreachcategory.Foreachcategory,wealsogivetheaveragedsuccessratesachievedbyour
participantsandoursolver,aswellastheaveragedratinggivenbytheparticipants.
Weseethatusingmoresecurityfeaturesincreasesthedi cultyforacomputerprogramtosolve
acaptchachallenge,butitalsodecreasesuserexperience.Thiscanbeillustratedthattheaveraged
humansuccessrateforthecaptchasincategory6ofTable6isbelow70%,meaningthatnearly
one-thirdofthetimeauserwillenterawronganswerforcaptchasinthiscategory.Therefore,
captchasinthiscategoryweregiventhelowestusabilityscoreof2.1isnotsurprising.Wealso
observethatvarioussecurityfeatureshaveadiferentimpactontheefectivenessofourcaptcha
solver.Forexample,oursolvercanbetterhandlecaptchaswithnoisybackgroundsincategories
3and4thanthatwithdistortedcharactersincategories5and6.Asaresult,althoughacaptcha
imagewithanoisybackgroundmayhaveequallypoorusabilityasanotheronewithdistortedor
overlappingcharacters,thetwocaptchaimagescouldhavediferentdegreesofrobustnessunder
ourattack.℧oreover,asweexpect,thesuccessrateofacomputersolverdropsasthedi cultyof
thecaptchaincreases.
Wealsoindthatnoisybackgroundshaveanegativeimpactontheuserexperiencebecauseour
participantsgaveanaveragedusabilityscoreoflessthan3forcaptchasincategories3and4of
Table6.Ontheotherhand,backgroundconfusionhaslittlecontributiontothesecuritystrength
ofcaptchasunderourattack.Thiscanbeconirmedf romthes imilar,orevenbetter-solving
performancegivenbyoursolverwhencomparedtohumanparticipantsforcaptchasinthetwo
categories.Thisindingsuggeststhatcomplexbackgroundconfusionperhapsshouldbeabandoned
infuturetextcaptchaschemes.Overall,thisuserstudyshowsthataGAN-basedcaptchasolver
canachievecomparableperformanceforsolvingtextcaptchaswhencomparedtohumans,but
balancingthesecurityandusabilityofatextcaptchaschemeisnottrivial.
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Table 7. Success rate of comparing to RCN [20] for classifying the MNIST dataset.
# of per digit 20 40 60 80 100
RCN 96.5% 97.3% 97.6% 97.8% 98%
Our ine-tuned solver 96.2% 98.3% 98.9% 99.2% 99.8%
6.8 Generalization Ability
Given the scope of this work, we cannot test our approach on all current captcha schemes. To
evaluate our approach's generalization ability for character recognition, we apply it to the MNIST
dataset. This dataset contains a large number of handwritten digits of diferent forms.
We follow the same methodology as we have used throughout the evaluation to build a MNIST
solver, i.e., by irst building a synthesizer, then a base solver and a ine-tuned solver. We train the
synthesizer using up to 500 real MNIST images. Next, we build the base solve using 100,000 synthetic
images before ine-tuning the base solver using the same set of real MNIST images. We compare
our solver with the recently proposed RCN [20], which was shown to be efective by using a small
number of training samples. We test both approaches on images that are not seen in the training
phase.
As can be seen from Table 7, our approach gives a marginally lower accuracy when using 20 real
MNIST images per digit, but it outperforms the RCN when using 40 or more real images per digit. In
other words, our approach is efective on another image classiication dataset, indicating that our
approach has a good generalization ability.
Extend to other captcha schemes. We believe our approach is generally applicable and can be
naturally extended for video and image captchas by adapting the network architecture to recognize
objects from the inputs; and favorably, the process of synthetic data generation, model training
and tuning still is unchanged. This lexibility allows one to attack various types of captchas, not
just text-based ones. For example, to target NuCAPTCHA [56], a motion-based captcha scheme,
we need to replace our CNN solver with a model similar to the ℧ask R-CNN [29]. The idea is to
irst segment the video frames into images and then recognize characters from individual images.
After replacing the solver structure, we also need to extend our GAN-based captcha synthesizer
to generate a sequence of synthetic images (as recognition is performed at the image level). For
motion-based captchas, the key is to maintain the temporal relationships among images, for which
a temporal CNN can be useful [40].
7 POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES
7.1 Security Enhance through Adversarial Example Generation
Recent works have shown that adversarial examples generated by inserting some perturbations
onto a target image can confuse a machine-learned image classiier [65]. Recent work has exploited
this observation to improve the security of captcha images [51, 58]. However, the perturbations
or noise generated by prior methods [51, 58] are often noticeable by a human eye and as a result,
our preprocessing model is efective in removing these perturbations. Hence, a better approach is
to make the perturbations imperceptible, so that it has less impact on the user experience while
increases the di culty for training a successful preprocessing model.
However, one of the challenges for generating imperceptible perturbations is that the generation
scheme is tightly coupled to both the captcha image and the captcha solver. This raises a practical
issue because the captcha designer often does not have a copy of the solver implementation. To
demonstrate this point, we use synthetic Baidu captchas to train ive captcha solvers (in addition
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Table 8. Examples of original captcha (No. 1) and the corresponding adversarial captchas with diferent
perturbations (No. 2 - 6) .
No. Captcha Ours MaxoutNet NetInNet GoogleNet VGG ResNet18
1 L℧GW(
√
) L℧GW(
√
) L℧GW(
√
) L℧GW(
√
) L℧GW(
√
) L℧GW(
√
)
2 N℧GW(×) V℧GW(×) I℧GW(×) I℧GW(×) L℧GW(√) N℧GW(×)
3 LWWW(×) L℧℧W(×) LWNW(×) LWWN(×) VWNW(×) L℧GW(√)
4 L℧GW(
√
) L℧SW(×) LWSW(×) LWSW(×) L℧GW(√) LWGW(×)
5 L℧GW(
√
) LNGW(×) VWGW(×) LNNW(×) LWWW(×) LWGW(×)
6 LW℧W(×) LWGW(×) LWWW(×) LWGW(×) LWWW(×) LW℧W(×)
toourLeNet-5-basedmodel),basedoniveestablishedCNNmodels:℧axoutNet[26],NetInNet[44],
GoogleNet[63],VGG[60],ResNet18[30].Wethenapplyeachtrainedsolvertoacaptchaimagewith
diferentimperceptibleperturbations.Table8showstheoriginalcaptchaimageanditsadversarial
versions,andthepredictiongivenbydiferentsolvers.Toaidreadability,wemarktheperturbations,
whichareimperceptibletotheparticipantsinouruserstudy,usingablackbox.Ascanbeseen
fromthetable,aperturbationschemetunedforaparticularnetworkcannotinvalidothers.
Oneapproachforimprovingthegeneralizationabilityoftheperturbationschemeistoindways
togenerateperturbationsthatcaninvalidatethecommonlyusedimageclassiicationmodels.To
thisend,weimplementaprototypingadversarialgeneratortotargettheCNN-basedmodelslisted
inTable8.
7.1.1 Countermeasureprototype.Ourprototypehasthreecomponents:afeaturelocationmodule,
aperturbationgenerationmodelandanadversarialsolver,describedasfollows.
Thefeaturelocationmoduleindswhichareasofthecaptchaimagearemostimportantfor
successfulrecognitionofagivencaptchaimageacrossnetworkarchitectures.Todoso,weirst
applyslidingwindowstodivideacaptchaimageintoanumberofareasfromthedirectionoftopto
bottom,lefttoright.WethenaddrandomnoiseintoeachareatoobservewhethertheCNNmodel
canmisclassifythecaptchaimageandtheareasthatcanconfusetheCNNmodelwillbeselected
asthecriticallocations.Oncethesecriticalareasarelocated,theperturbationgenerationmodule
(builtupon[43])willgeneratetheadversarialcaptchaimagebyinsertingtheperturbationsinto
eachoftheseareas.Notethattheperturbationgeneratormayproducediferentperturbationsfor
diferentareas.Weruntheperturbedimagesthroughasetofpre-trainedcaptchasolvers(built
upondiferentnetworkarchitectures)tocheckiftheperturbedimagescanconfuseallthesolvers.
Ifnot,weasktheperturbationgeneratortocreateanewsetofperturbationsuntilthissuccess
criterionismetorthegenerationtimehasexceededathreshold(settothreesecondsinourcase).
Toenhancethetransferabilityofthesyntheticadversarialcaptchas,weareinspiredbyXieet
al.[69]andapplyrandommultiscaletransformationstoeachcriticalareasateachiteration.Inthe
lattercase,wechoosetheimagethatcanconfusethelargestnumberoftargetingsolvers.
7.1.2 Evaluationofcountermeasure.Weevaluateourcaptchageneratorusingthe1,000realSohu
captchasthatwereusedintheevaluationreportedinSection6.Wechoosethisschemebecause
oursolverishighlyeffectiveinsolvingitbygivingthehighestsuccessrate.Theresultsforusing
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Fig. 18. The success rates when targeting the original Sohu captchas and the adversarial versions generated
by our scheme.
and without using our perturbation scheme are shown in Figure 18. Our perturbation scheme
signiicantly reduces the success rate for solving the Sohu scheme when using a CNN-based solver.
7.1.3 Limitations of countermeasure. We acknowledge that our countermeasure does not eliminate
the vulnerability of text captchas under deep-learning-based attacks, as an attacker can still use
a network that is diferent from the ones targeting by our perturbation generator. However, we
ind that changing the number of layers or neurons, or the size of the convolutional layers of a
solver has little impact on our perturbation scheme. We also ind that using a deeper network
does not signiicantly improve the success rate for solving perturbed captcha images because most
of the captcha images are of small sizes and hence a deeper network does not ofer additional
beneits. Nonetheless, we want to stress that while our countermeasure can help to improve the
security strength of current text captcha schemes, they will become inevitably less secure when
more advanced deep neural network architectures are proposed. Therefore, the community should
revisit the use of text captchas.
7.2 Other Alternative Countermeasures
Some alternatives have been proposed to replace text captchas. These include video-based
captachas like NuCAPTCHA [56] and game-based CAPTCHAs [49]. The former was shown to be
vulnerable [7, 71]. The later seemly ofers some promises but the recently breakthrough of deep
reinforcement learning in game playing may pose a threat to such schemes [48]. To have a robust
countermeasure, one probably need to combine multiple mechanisms similar to the multi-factor
authentication protocol [37, 57]. Nonetheless, how to balance the security strength and usability of
a scheme is still an outstanding problem.
8 RELATEDWORK
The work presented by ℧ori et al. [28] was among the irst text captcha solvers. Their approach
employs a set of analytical models and heuristics to attack Gimpy and EZ-Gimpy, two early simple
text-based captcha schemes. Since then, a large body of work arose for exploring ways to improve
the security of text captchas, building upon attacks on existing captcha schemes. Due to these
successful attacks, text captchas are going through an iterative development process, which are
still preferred by many users, primarily for the familiarity and a sense of security and control [39].
Segmentation-based atacks. This type of attacks irst segments characters of a captcha image
and then identiies each segmented character using machine-learning algorithms. Yan et al. show
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asimplecharactersegmentationmethod[72],whichcountsthenumberofpixelsofindividual
characters, canbreakmostof thecaptchas fromCaptchaservices.org.Later, they showan
improvedsegmentationmethodcanbeusedtoattacktheearlycaptchaschemesusedbyYahoo!,
MicrosoftandGoogle[73].Unlikeourapproach,alltheaforementionedattacksaretightlycoupled
tothecaptchaschemeandhardtogeneralize.Thismeanstotargetanewscheme,theywould
requirehumaninvolvementtorevisetheexistingheuristicsandpossiblytodesignnewheuristics.
Deep-learning-basedatacks.Decaptcha[8]employsmachine-learning-basedclassiierstode-
velopagenericattackfortext-basedcaptchas.Itcanbreak13captchaschemesbutachieveszero
successonmoredi cultschemesincludingreCAPTCHAandGooglescheme.Bycontrast,ourap-
proachnotonlygivesahigheraccuracyontheschemeswhereDecpatchasucceedsbutalsodelivers
asuccessrateof87.4%onreCAPTCHAforwhichDecaptchahasasuccessrateofzero(seeTable5).
Recently,Georgeetal.presentsRecursiveCorticalNetwork(RCN)forimagerecognition[20].The
RCNisefectiveinrecognizingindividualcharactersbutarelessefectiveforsolvingtext-based
captchaswhencomparedtoourapproach.Inparticular,onthePayPaldataset,ourapproachboosts
thesuccessratefrom57.1%to92.4%.Starketal.[62]showthatactivelearningcanbeusedto
reducethenumberofcaptchasrequiredtolearnasolver.However,thisapproachrequireshaving
accesstoacaptchageneratorofthetargetscheme,whichisoftennotavailabletotheadversary.
Ontheotherhand,activelearningiscomplementarytoourapproachasitallowsthelearning
enginetouseafewernumberoftrainingsamplestospeedupthetrainingprocess.
Otheratacks.TheworkpresentedbyGaoetal.targetscaptchasofhollowcharacters[16].Their
approachirstillsthehollowcharacterstrokes,andthensearchesforthepossiblecombinations
ofadjacentcharacterstrokestorecognizeindividualcharacters.Whileareefectiveonhollow
characters,thisapproachisinefectiveoncaptchaimageswithoverlappinganddistortedcharacters.
Theirmorerecentwork[18]usestheLog-Gaboriltertoirstextractcharactercomponentsfrom
thecaptchaimage;itthenusesthek-NearestNeighboralgorithmtorecognizeindividualcharacters
usingtheextractedinformation.DuetothelimitationoftheLog-Gaborilter,theirmethodis
inefectiveforcaptchaimageswithnoisybackgrounds,e.g.BaiducaptchashowninFigure1b.
Alternativecaptchaschemes.Itisworthmentioningthattherearealsoothercaptchaschemes
builtaroundimages [3,14,27,50,54],audiodata[6,55]orrecentlyadversarialcaptchas[58].
℧anyofthesewereproposedtoreplacetextcaptchas.However,thesealternativeschemesareless
popularthantextcaptchasandwereshowntobevulnerabletoo[9,19,46,49,61,66].Inparticular,
asigniicantweaknessofanimage-basedschemeisthatthenumberofimagesusedbythescheme
istypicallylimited.Asaresult,anadversarymayexploitsidechannelstoobtainandlabelalarge
portionoftheimagesusedbyascheme[32].
Adversarialmachinelearning.Asainalremark,wewouldliketopointoutthatourworkbuilds
uponthefoundationsofadversarialmachinelearning[24,33].Thistechniqueisshowntobeuseful
inconstructingadversarialapplicationstobypassmalwaredetection[53,70],escapefromspam
maililtering[5],orconfusemachinelearningclassiiers[25,47].However,noworktodatehas
employedthetechniquetoconstructagenericsolverfortextcaptchas,andourworkistheirstto
doso.
9 CONCLUSION
ThisarticlehaspresentedtheirstGAN-basedgenericsolverfortextcaptcha.Oursolverisbuilt
byirstlearningacaptchasynthesizertoautomaticallygeneratesynthetictrainingexamplesto
buildabasesolver,andthenreiningthebasesolverusingtransferlearning.Thisfeatureallows
ourapproachreliesonfewerrealcaptchastoconstructthesolver,andcantargetawiderangeof
schemes.Asaresult,ourapproachneedslesshumaninvolvementcomparedtopriormethods.
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Our approach was evaluated on 33 text captcha schemes, including 11 schemes that were being
used by 32 of the top-50 popular websites at the time this study was conducted. Experimental
results show that our approach outperforms four start-of-the arts by successfully solving more
captchas. We show that our approach is robust and generally applicable, which can break many
advanced security features used by modern text captchas. Our results suggest that these advanced
features only make it di cult for a legitimate user but would fail to stop automated programs. As a
countermeasure, we show that by inserting some imperceptible perturbations on a captcha image,
one can enhance the security strength of text captchas under deep-learning-based attacks.
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